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Abstract 
Using state-level data from the United States, we find that differences in colonial legal 
institutions have affected the current quality of state legal institutions.  These differences in 
colonial legal institutions arose because some states were settled by Great Britain, a common law 
country, and other states were settled by France, Spain, and Mexico, all civil law countries. To 
explain these findings, we develop a transplant-civil law hypothesis that highlights the disruption 
associated with large-scale legal transplantation and the possible relative inefficiencies of 
colonial civil law.  We find strong support for the transplant-civil law hypothesis. Our results are 
robust to the inclusion of additional variables capturing climate, geography, initial population, 
resource endowments, state level rules, and legal environment. Given the 150-200 year gap 
between the initial conditions and the measures of the current quality of legal institutions, we 
provide indirect evidence on the persistence of legal institutions. We then use initial legal 
systems as a source of exogenous variation in current institutions for providing a series of 
estimates of their impact on current economic performance.  
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I. Introduction 
Fifteen American states were originally settled by France, Spain, or Mexico, all countries 
with civil law legal systems.  Shortly after the acquisition of a territory by Great Britain or later 
by the United States, all of the states except Louisiana adopted common law.  Many residents in 
these former territories were unhappy with the change of legal system. For example, the local 
French population in Vincennes complained to the local judge that because of the imposition of 
common law, “laws are too complex, not to be understood and tedious in their operation.”
1  A 
Missouri resident wrote to then President Thomas Jefferson in 1805, “Many people here do not 
like the Change  & every Law that is pass’d puts them on a Worse Situation than they would 
have been under the Spaniards is Criticiz’d & the Worst Construction put on.”
2 The adoption of 
common law engendered significant debate before the first meeting of the California legislature.
3  
Elisha Crosby, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee during this meeting noted, “There was 
quite an element of Civil Law in the Legislature and many wanted that adopted as a rule.”
4  In 
the ten states that w ere acquired after the American Revolution by the United States, there is 
substantial evidence that the new common law legal systems retained elements of their civil law 
predecessors. 
The different settlement patterns within the United States provide a unique natural 
experiment that enables us to test whether differences in colonial legal institutions, and 
subsequent transplantation of common law on civil law legal systems, can explain the variation 
in the quality of contemporary legal institutions.   Contemporary cross-country evidence suggests 
that common law legal institutions are of higher quality than civil law legal institutions. (La 
Porta et al. 1998, 1999 and Djankov et al. 2002, 2003 and Botera et. al. 2003).  Cross-country 
evidence also indicates that the process of transplantation can have long-term effects on the 
quality of legal institutions (Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard 2003).  
We use this natural experiment to test two hypotheses.  The first hypothesis, which we 
call the transplant-civil law hypothesis, is that persistent negative shocks to the legal systems 
arose from the inferiority of colonial civil law relative to colonial common law, from 
transplantation of common law onto civil law legal systems, or from both. The alternative 
hypothesis, which we call the transitory hypothesis, is that the effects of the colonial civil law 
legal system and the transplantation of common law may have had short-run effects on legal 
institutions, but that time and mobility rendered these effects transitory.      2 
To test the transplant-civil law hypothesis, we use climate, membership in the 
Confederacy, and initial settlement by civil or common law countries (as measured by historical 
land grant data) to control for initial conditions in regressions in which the dependent variable is 
the quality of state courts in 2001. We have three main findings.  First, in regressions using a 
number of different measures of contemporary legal institutions as the dependent variable, we 
find strong evidence for the transplant-civil law hypothesis. Having had a civil law legal system 
after the American Revolution has a significant and large negative effect on contemporary legal 
institutions. Thus, if we could rewrite history and change the initial legal system of states that 
had a civil law tradition after the American Revolution, the quality of contemporary state courts 
would increase roughly one standard deviation, which accounts for the difference between the 
quality of courts in Virginia and Nevada, or the difference between Nevada and Arkansas.   
Second, because of the 150-200 year gap between the initial conditions and available 
measures of the quality of state legal institutions, legal institutions would have to be very 
persistent for us to find a measurable effect.  Using state budgetary data and corruption data, we 
provide indirect evidence that suggests that the quality of legal institutions is very persistent.   
Third, we argue that the initial legal system is a plausible instrument for measuring the 
impact of contemporary legal institutions on contemporary economic performance, and we 
validate this instrumental variables approach with an over-identification test. After controlling 
for a broad set of covariates that could influence both institutions and economic performance, we 
find that a change in the initial legal system of a state from civil to common law would be 
associated with a statistically and quantitatively significant increase in median household 
income, and a statistically and quantitatively significant decrease in the poverty rate. 
Our paper contributes to analysis of the determinants of good institutions. La Porta et al 
(1998, 1999) provide cross-country evidence that, conditional on differences in gross national 
product per capita, common law legal institutions are currently more effective than civil law 
legal institutions at enforcing rule of law. Several influential cross-country studies, however, 
stress the importance of initial conditions. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) show that 
that in former colonies the disease environment at the time of colonization influenced initial 
institution building and this, in turn, had a long-term effect on institutions. Engerman and 
Sokoloff (2002) highlight the long-term impact of initial climate, location, and resource 
endowments. Two potential problems with cross-country analysis of the determinants of good     3 
institutions are the substantial unobserved, and difficult to control for, heterogeneity across 
countries, and the substantial within-country variation in the quality of legal institutions (Jappelli 
et al 2002, Laeven and Woodruff 2003).  We address these problems by using state level data 
from the United States (see, also, Banarjee and Iyer (2002) for India) 
Like the cross-country literature, we find that initial conditions matter.  In contrast to 
Acemoglou et al (2001), however, we find that both climate, which is related to the disease 
environment in which early settlers lived, and legal families are important determinants of long-
run institutions.  Our findings about legal families are somewhat different from the findings in La 
Porta et al (1998, 1999). In their study, countries did not change legal systems, so it is difficult to 
separate out the initial legal family and any transplantation effects from subsequent influences on 
the legal family related to culture, levels of economic development, and the rise of mineral and 
oil based industries, among others. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes the initial legal systems in the 
states and the transition to common law for states that were initially civil law.  Section III 
examines the determinants of the quality of state courts in 2001.  Section IV investigates the 
robustness of the findings in section III to alternative dependent and independent variables, and 
provides evidence of institutional persistence.  Section V uses initial legal family as an 
instrument for the quality of state courts to measure the effect of the quality of courts on two 
economic outcomes, household income and the share of households in poverty.  Section VI 
concludes. 
 
II. Initial Legal Conditions   
Classification of States by Original Legal Tradition 
Our approach is to classify the forty-eight continental states as having one of four types 
of initial legal conditions: civil law acquired prior to the American Revolution, civil law acquired 
after American Revolution, common law, or settler.  Civil law states were initially settled by 
civil law countries such as France, Spain, or Mexico. The subdivision of civil law states reflects 
the fact that some states were acquired by Great Britain and others by the United States.  The 
distinction between these two types of civil law states would capture any differences associated 
with Great Britain, the United States, policies towards acquired territory, the timing of 
settlement, and other factors. Common law states were initially settled by Great Britain, and     4 
settler states were settled by the United States.   The distinction between the common law states 
and settler states would capture any differences between having legal institutions that originated 
with British common law, and legal institutions that originated with American common law. 
  Classification is complicated by at least two factors.  First, we need to distinguish 
between territory that was nominally held by a country and territory that was actually settled by 
that country.  In particular, for legal institutions to have been persistent, there has to be a reason 
to believe that there were legal institutions operating in the area.  Second, there is a significant 
time dimension as well.  A number of the states on the Eastern Seaboard that one might 
automatically think of as having originally been British common law, because they were among 
the original thirteen colonies, were settled or controlled in part by  civil law countries such as the 
Netherlands, Sweden, France, or Spain during the 1600s.  By the end of the 1600s, however, the 
British controlled the thirteen colonies.  The British acquired significant territory from France in 
the 1700s, and the United States acquired significant territory from France, Spain, Mexico, and 
Great Britain in the 1800s.   
  We classified the eighteen states that arose from the original thirteen British colonies as 
common law states.  Some states such as West Virginia and Maine were admitted as states quite 
late, but were created by subdividing Virginia and Massachusetts.  Kentucky was originally part 
of Virginia, and Tennessee was originally part of North Carolina.  Both New York and New 
Hampshire claimed ownership of Vermont, but Vermont resisted both, creating an independent 
republic prior to joining the Union.  All of these shared the original colony’s legal system. 
As we noted, however, because four of the eighteen states appear to have had permanent 
settlements by civil law countries during the seventeenth century, and at least five others had 
temporary settlements, classification of these states as common law is open to question.
5  The 
Dutch had settlements in Connecticut, Delaware, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, 
although the settlements in Connecticut appear to have been temporary. The population of Dutch 
New Netherlands was estimated to be 9,000 in 1664, the year that Great Britain acquired the 
territory.
6  The Swedish had settlements in Delaware and Pennsylvania.
7  Further, there are 
historical records of Dutch and Swedish courts operating in Delaware, New York, New Jersey, 
and Pennsylvania.
8  Because of the early nature and relatively short duration of Dutch and 
Swedish control, we classify these states as common law.  In the empirical work, however, we 
check for robustness by re-classifying the four states with operational courts as civil law.     5 
  For later acquisitions, including the territory that Great Britain acquired from France 
prior to the American Revolution, and all the territory that the United States acquired from 
France, Spain, Mexico, and Great Britain after the American Revolution, we can use land grant 
records confirmed by the United States as an indirect measure of settlement by c ivil law 
governments.  This is an indirect measure, because the processes for submission and the extent 
of United States government scrutiny of land grants varied considerably over time (Clay 1999).  
In Table 1, we list by state the number of confirmed foreign land claims derived from French, 
Spanish, or Mexican land grants.  States that were part of the territory acquired by Great Britain 
from France prior to the American Revolution: Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Ohio, 
are included because the United States established land commissions after the American 
Revolution to incorporate the French land grants into the American system of property rights. 
For all of the states with at least 200 confirmed claims, we were able to find additional 
evidence that confirmed the settlement and operation of a civil law legal system that saw a full 
range of cases.
9  These states were classified as civil law states. We more carefully scrutinized 
the five states with fewer than 200 land grants - Wisconsin, Ohio, Arizona, Colorado, and Iowa.  
The historical evidence suggests that the Colorado and Iowa grants were large speculative grants 
that were intended to induce, but never actually led to, substantial settlement.
10  Thus we classify 
Colorado and Iowa as settler states.  Wisconsin and Ohio appear to have had sufficient 
permanent settlement to have had some type of local judicial official, but may not have had 
fully-functioning courts.
11  Although Arizona had fewer grants than Wisconsin and Ohio, a 
number of these were pueblo (town) grants and so would have encompassed multiple settlers.  
Arizona also had strong links to New Mexico, which had a well-developed court system.  We 
classify Wisconsin, Ohio, and Arizona as civil law.  In the empirical analysis, we check the 
robustness of our results by reclassifying these three states as settler states. 
  All states west of the Mississippi not included in Table 1 were classified as settler states.  
For the 48 states in the continental United States, Table 2 shows the classification of the states, 
the dates of statehood, and the date of the first census, and the corresponding state population, 
state area, and state population density. When compared to the common law states, civil law 
states and settler states had smaller populations, larger total areas, and much lower population 
densities at the time of their first census.     6 
United States Acquisition of Territory from Foreign Governments 
As the United States acquired land from foreign governments, the issue of bringing the 
existing land and people into the United States legal system came to the fore.  Early on territorial 
and state legislatures were effectively required to adopt American common law.
12 This posed 
few problems, since the territory involved was very lightly populated a nd had been settled 
largely by British or American colonists.  
In territory that had been using civil law, the arrival of large numbers of American 
settlers eventually “doomed civil law everywhere except Louisiana.”  Not all residents in the 
[post-American Revolution] civil law states were happy with the change, however, nor was the 
adoption of common law complete.  Although Jefferson wanted to Louisiana to adopt American 
common law, civil law was well entrenched and the native population was large.
13 Thus, in 1806 
the territorial legislature chose civil over common law.  Interestingly, what adopting civil law 
meant was not entirely clear because the law had not been codified.  As a result, the Creole 
population clamored for a codification of existing law. A compromise was eventually reached, 
wherein Jefferson permitted the adoption of a civil code in 1808 in return for acceptance of 
American rule.   
During the transitional period, there was a tendency for the legal systems to be 
hybridized.  The hybridization was in part by design.  American officials in Missouri wrote that 
they wanted “to assimilate by insensible means, the habits and customs of the American and 
French inhabitants; by interweaving some of the regulations of the latter into our Laws, we 
procure a ready obedience, without violence or complaint.”
14  A few years later, civil law was 
abolished in Arkansas and Missouri.  In Texas, California, New Mexico, and Arizona, however, 
substantial amounts of civil law survived as it related to marital property and wills.  Because the 
United States Supreme Court recognized property rights regarding land granted by prior 
governments, civil law also continued to have an effect on property rights in land. Even in 
Louisiana, some hybridization occurred.
15  For instance, the territorial legislature adopted 
common law elements like trial by jury and habeas corpus.  And Federal law as it applied to 
Louisiana was common law.       7 
III.  Determinants of Current Quality of State Courts 
   We begin by describing our dependent variable and the two types of independent 
variables:  initial conditions and contemporary inputs into the legal system.  We then present the 
results of our regressions.   
Dependent Variable 
Our primary measure of quality of contemporary institutions is the quality of state courts 
as measured by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce-States Liability Ranking Survey.   The survey 
was a telephone survey of a nationally representative sample of 824 senior attorneys at 
companies with annual revenues of at least $100 million  conducted during November and 
December of 2001.
16 Attorneys evaluated the overall treatment of tort and contract litigation, 
timeliness of summary judgment/dismissal, discovery, scientific and technical evidence, 
impartiality of judges, competence of judges, predictability of juries and fairness of juries on a 
discrete scale of 0 (worst) to 4 (best) for states for which they were familiar.
17  The average 
attorney evaluated 4.4 states.  We use the average score over the 8 categories for each state.  For 
the overall quality, the scores averaged 2.3 and ranged from a low of 1.2 for Mississippi to a high 
of 3.1 for Delaware.  As an alternate measure of the quality of courts, we use the average score 
for the state for judges’ competence.  These scores averaged 2.5 and ranged from a low of 1.4, 
again for Mississippi, to a high of 3.5 for Delaware.  Summary statistics are presented in Table 3.  
Variable definitions and selected state-level data are presented in Appendix Tables 1 and 2. 
Independent Variables 
To measure initial conditions, we use five variables. Three are related to the colonial 
legal system; one is related to the climate; and one captures membership in the Confederacy.  As 
we discussed in the previous section, we divided the forty-eight states into four mutually 
exclusive categories based on their colonial legal systems:  i) states that only had civil law prior 
to the American Revolution; ii) states that had civil law after the American Revolution; iii) states 
did not have a colonial legal system (settler states); and iv) states that had common law.  Dummy 
variables were created for each of the first three categories.  In all of our regressions, common 
law is the omitted variable.   
To measure climate, we interact a state’s annual average temperature, humidity, and 
precipitation and then divide by 10,000 to lower the magnitude of this variable.
18  This variable 
enables us to control for the effects of climate related to disease and to the economic and     8 
political systems (see Acemoglu et al, 2001, and Engermann and Sokoloff, 2002).  Table 4 
shows the strong association between our climate variable and three measures of disease: yellow 
fever, malaria, and soldier mortality in the 1880s.
19  
Confederate state is a dummy variable that measures membership in the Confederacy 
during the American Civil War. Much like the climate variable, we include Confederate not to 
test the transplant-civil law hypothesis, but to control for the effects of slavery and the Civil War.  
In line with Engerman and Sokoloff (2002), slavery itself could have had a negative effect on the 
legal system.  And even if slavery did not have a negative effect, the disruption in the legal 
system associated with the Civil War and Reconstruction could have.  
To measure inputs into the legal system, we use five variables: three that measure judicial 
appointment processes and three that are less direct inputs.  With respect to how the judiciary 
arrive on the bench as of 1990, we divide states into three mutually exclusive categories that are 
ranked in descending order according to the independence it provides for its judges in the highest 
state courts
20 (see Hanssen, 2002): the merit system, the judicial appointment system, and the 
partisan election system. The merit system entails the appointment of a candidate by an elected 
official (usually the governor) from a shortlist of candidates proposed by a nominating 
commission. The chosen candidate stands for subsequent terms in uncontested retention 
elections. The judicial appointment system entails initial selection of candidates by the governor, 
the legislature, or through non-partisan elections (where judges are not allowed to declare a party 
affiliation). This category also includes judges selected in partisan elections but then retained by 
the governor. The partisan system entails selection and retention of judges in partisan elections. 
Dummy variables were created for the first two categories and are measured relative to partisan 
elections.   
We also include three less direct types of inputs. The first is the log of the annual average 
state constitutional amendment rate, and this varies across states and is a measure of the power of 
the legislature to interfere with the activity of the judiciary and courts. In some states, the 
legislature can do little if the judiciary rules a particular piece of legislation unconstitutional.  In 
other states, the legislature can readily amend the state constitution to make the legislation 
constitutional and use this to overturn judicial decisions.  We also include two other measures: 
the number of lawyers per 1,000 residents, and a dummy variable for all states that have at least 
one law school in the top 50 as ranked by experts (judges and lawyers) in the U.S. News &     9 
World Report, 2001.
21  The annual state constitutional amendment rate ranged from   0.25 in 
Vermont to  8.07 in Alabama (because its distribution is skewed upwards, we use its log value); 
the number of lawyers ranged from 1.847 per 1,000 in South Carolina to 6.862 in Massachusetts, 
and seventeen of the forty-eight states have a top fifty ranked law school. 
Regression Results 
In Table 5 we present OLS regressions that examine the determinants of the current 
quality of state courts. We begin by including the two types of variables: initial conditions and 
inputs into the legal system, separately. Because we have only forty-eight observations, our 
estimated standard errors will tend to be large when we include several explanatory variables. 
Thus, to improve efficiency, for the columns where some variables are insignificant, we apply 
the general to specific technique as advocated by Hendry (2000), and report test statistics to 
check for the validity of these joint exclusions.
22  
  In column (1), we investigate the relationship between having been a Confederate State 
during the American Civil War and the current quality of the state’s courts.
23  The relationship is 
negative, economically large and statistically significant.  As we noted earlier, there are a 
number of possible causes.  Confederate states may have had poorer quality judicial systems 
prior to the Civil War for reasons either related or unrelated to the institution of slavery. The 
Civil War and Reconstruction may also have represented a significant negative shock to the 
judiciary, independent of the previous quality of the judiciary.
24  The negative effect of being a 
Confederate state does not, however, survive the inclusion of the civil law and settler state 
distinctions and the climate variable in columns (2) and (3).  
In columns (2) and (3), we use the measures of initial conditions to test the transplant-
civil law hypothesis.  Consistent with this hypothesis, the coefficient on post-Revolution civil 
law is negative and significant at the 1-percent level.  Climate also has a negative and significant 
effect, supporting previous findings that hot, humid, and wet climates have negative effects on 
legal systems.  If the effects of the transition and the climate were at least in part transitory, we 
would have expected the coefficients on the initial legal conditions to all be insignificant or at the 
very least small in magnitude. After controlling for climate and the other initial state categories, 
however, a civil law post-Revolution tradition is associated with more than a one standard 
deviation (0.35 on a scale of 0 to 4) fall in the quality of state courts, which is equivalent to 
Maryland or Nevada falling to the level of Arkansas.      10 
The insignificance of the post-Revolutionary civil law and settler state and confederate 
state dummies in column (2) and their elimination in (3), implies that the impact of these initial 
conditions on current institutions is indistinguishable from a common law tradition.  In the case 
of pre-Revolution civil law states, this is not entirely surprising, since they experienced 
transplantation earlier and had smaller and sparser populations at the time of transplantation than 
the post-Revolution civil law states.    
In column (4), we examine the effects of current inputs into the legal system and exclude 
initial conditions.  All the coefficients are significant. In terms of how judges reach the bench, 
states that use a merit system have better quality courts than states that use an appointment 
system, and both have better courts than states using partisan elections. This is consistent with 
the idea that judicial independence improves the effectiveness of judges and courts, and the merit 
system provides the most independence and partisan elections provide the least independence 
(see Hanssen, 2002). Frequent changes to the state constitutions and the number of lawyers per 
capita are both associated with lower quality courts, and the number of law schools in the top 
fifty has a small positive association.  
In columns (5) and (6) we combine initial conditions and current inputs in order to test 
the transplant-civil law hypothesis.  Consistent with this hypothesis, the coefficient on civil law 
post-Revolution remains significant at the 1-percent level, and is still associated with roughly a 
one standard deviation decline in the quality of courts. In column (5), all of the initial conditions 
are statistically insignificant except the settler state dummy, which is marginally significant (p-
value is 0.085) and quantitatively small. When we apply the step-wise procedure however, all 
current inputs except the constitution amendment rate survive, and, most importantly, the post-
Revolution civil law category remains quantitatively and statistically significant. 
The robust effect of the post-Revolution civil law effect raises the question of the 
channels through which this effect was transmitted.  Possible avenues include judges, the law, 
and norms.  Judges typically play a different rule under civil law than under common law.  
Specifically, under civil law, judges are less independent of the legislative branch, because their 
role is to interpret the code.  This relative lack of prestige and power may have led to lower 
quality judges in the colonial period and persisted after the transition to common law. The need 
to be able to function under the civil and common law during the transition may also have led to 
initial, and possibly a persistent problem for these states in attracting high quality judges.  As we     11 
discussed earlier, the laws themselves differed across the two types of states both before and 
even after the transition. These differences may also have had a persistent effect.  The academic 
literature on norms suggests that norms play an important role in reinforcing the law.  Norms in 
civil law states may not have provided the same level of support for the law after the change to 
common law.  Any one of these or some combination of them may have had persistent negative 
effects on the legal institutions of the post-Revolution civil law states. 
 
IV. Alternative Dependent Variables, Additional Independent Variables, and Persistence 
  The significance and the magnitude of the effect of having been settled by a civil law 
country and adopted common law after the American Revolution in Table 5 are extremely 
suggestive.  A caveat, however, is whether these results are attributable either to some feature of 
the dependent variable or to the omission of important independent variables.  A related issue is 
whether it is plausible to believe that initial legal conditions would have persisted over a 150-to- 
200-year period.  I n this section, we consider alternative dependent variables, additional 
independent variables, and persistence. 
Alternative Dependent Variables 
In this section, we use four additional indirect measures of institutions: judicial 
competence (taken from the 2001 survey), annual average property crimes and violent crimes per 
100,000 population for 1999-2001, and average federal public corruption convictions per 
100,000 for 1992-2001.
25 We compared the correlations of the quality of the courts and judicial 
competence in the 2001 survey with the four indirect measures.   Public corruption is negatively 
correlated with quality of state courts and judicial competence (correlation coefficients are –
0.475 and  –0.465, respectively; the correlations for property crimes and violent crimes are 
weaker but have the expected negative sign).   
In Table 6 we investigate whether our regression results are robust to these alternative 
measures. Because it is unclear how inputs into the legal system enter into the four indirect 
measures, we only include variables related to initial conditions. The regression for the quality of 
courts is presented for comparison purposes.  In the case of corruption, climate is the only 
significant initial condition.  In the alternative classification of states (see footnote 20), however, 
civil law post-Revolution replaces climate as the only significant variable. Civil law post-    12 
Revolution is significant and has the expected sign for judicial competence, property crime, and 
violent crime, and its significance is robust to the alternative classifications of states.  
Additional Determinants of Institutions 
In this section we check if our tests of the transplant-civil law hypothesis are robust to the 
inclusion of additional potential determinants of institutions such as natural resources (measured 
by whether or not a state had significant petroleum and natural gas production, and significant 
mining as of 1919), initial population density and geography (including state latitude and 
longitude, coastal or non-coastal location, and the share of counties in a state that are close to an 
ocean, close to a major river, close to a navigable river and close to a lake).  Table 7 reports 
regressions of the quality of state courts on our baseline initial conditions (pre-  and post-
Revolutionary civil law states, settler states, confederate states, and climate) and these additional 
variables. To save on degrees of freedom, we report only the results obtained using the step-wise 
procedure (again, joint exclusions are fully validated with the F-test reported in this table). 
Column (1) in Table 1 includes natural resources and initial population density, column 
(2) includes geography variables and column (3) includes both. It is notable that in all cases the 
post-Revolution civil law effect remains significant at the 1-percent level and is still associated 
with roughly a one standard deviation decline in court quality; and, the civil-law pre-Revolution, 
settler, and confederate state categories remain statistically insignificant.  Additionally, the 
strong negative association between petroleum and natural gas resources and legal institutions 
could arise from a number of sources, but it is plausible that the discovery of these resources led 
to the corruption of the judiciary.       13 
Persistence 
For initial conditions 150-200 years earlier to affect the current quality of institutions, 
however, the quality of legal institutions would have to have been highly persistent over time.  
To test this, we would ideally have frequent measures of the quality of the courts over the 150-
200 year period. Unfortunately, such data do not exist.  We investigate persistence in two ways: 
by examining the effect of medium-term conditions on the quality of courts, and by presenting 
indirect evidence suggesting that state corruption and state expenditures on judicial institutions 
were persistent during the twentieth century.     
Our first approach to investigating persistence draws on data from medium-term 
conditions.  The five variables we use: migration, relative income per capita, black and white 
lynching, and voter participation, are all plausibly related to the quality of the state courts in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Migration is the inter-censal movement in 
(positive) and out (negative) of a state during 1870-1920 as a share of 1880 state population. In 
general, the story has been one of migration out of states with low economic opportunity 
(particularly for blacks) and to states with greater economic opportunity.  If people are also 
motivated by the quality of the legal system or if the quality of the legal system is correlated with 
economic opportunity, this variable may be related to the current quality of courts.  We also 
include initial state per capita income as a share of the United States per capita income averaged 
over the years 1929 and 1940.  If wealthier states can afford to provide higher quality legal 
systems, then current institutional quality may be linked to past economic prosperity.  Black and 
white lynching per 1,000 between 1889 and 1918 can be thought of as a measure of the rule of 
law.
26 The average of the voter participation rate in 1916 and 1920 reflects the extent to which 
civil participation is broad-based.   
In Table 8-Panel A., we explore the effects of medium-term institutions on the current 
quality of courts.  Black lynching is the only variable that is significant in column 4 and the only 
variable surviving from the general to specific test in column 5.
27  In Panel B, we explore the 
relationship between black lynching and the initial conditions.  Controlling for the black share of 
the population, black lynching per capita is statistically and quantitatively higher in post-
Revolution civil law states.  Settler states and climate are also positive and statistically 
significant.  This suggests that initial legal traditions and climate had a negative effect on 
medium-term institutions, and through these institutions on the contemporary quality of courts.      14 
Our second approach to investigating persistence draws on judicial expenditure data for 
selected years between 1902-1937, annual judicial expenditure data for 1951-2000, and annual 
state level data on prosecution of public officials for corruption covering 1976-2001.    We 
compare four state categories and two aggregate categories: overall common law (common law 
and settler states) and overall civil law (pre- and post-Revolutionary) states. Corruption is the 
rank of the state for per capita federal convictions of public officials for corruption per 100,000 
(population). Although corruption data are available yearly, they are extremely noisy with many 
states, particularly smaller states, having zeros in many years.  Following the United States 
Department of Justice convention, we have ranked the states based on their decadal average for 
1976-1981, 1982-1991, and 1992-2001.  For 1902-1937, the state court expenditure is spending 
on courts as a share of total expenditures for payments. For 1951-2000, the expenditure share is 
defined as the courts (criminal and civil) and activities associated with courts, legal services, and 
counseling of indigent or other need persons as a share of total state expenditures.   
Table 9 -Panel A suggests that judicial expenditure and corruption have differed 
historically across common and civil law states. For court expenditure shares and absence of 
corruption, the overall common law states are ranked on average 7 and 6.4 positions higher than 
overall civil law states.  These differences are significant at a 1-percent level.  Differences in 
expenditure shares have two, possibly complimentary, interpretations.  States vary in the duties 
assigned to the courts.  Lower expenditure shares could, therefore, reflect that courts in civil law 
states have more narrowly defined duties and require lower levels of funding.  Alternatively, 
these states may fund their court systems less generously, leading to lower quality courts.   
Table 9-Panel B examines the persistence of judicial expenditure and corruption. In the 
case of public corruption, we have only 3 periods of data, so we run an OLS regression. The 
coefficient on lagged rank of corruption, 0.514, is significant at the 1-percent level. To convert 
this association from a decadal to annual effect, we compute its tenth root: (0.514)
1/10 » 0.936. 
Given the standard errors on the point estimate, the range of persistence is from 0.11 to 0.48 
twenty years later and from 0 to 0.16 fifty years later.  Thus, corruption during the 1976-2001 
period appears to have been persistent.  Given the fairly short time period, it is difficult to 
determine whether the effects would have been persistent over a 150-200 year horizon.     15 
  In the case of judicial expenditure shares, we check for persistence using the panel unit 
root test of Levin et al (2003). We limit the analysis to the period 1951-2000 in which data is 
reported annually and estimate the following model: 
) 1 ( , 1 , , t i t i t i u JEXPshare JEXPshare + = - a  
where t = 1….50 denotes a particular year; i = 1…..48 denotes a particular state, JEXPsharei,t 
denotes the share of the state budget devoted to judicial expenditure share in the i
th state in the t
th 
year, and u i,t  (the error term) is distributed independently across states and may exhibit serial 
correlation (an auto-regressive moving average process).  
We test for the null of null hypothesis of unit root:  , 1 = a  against the alternative:  . 1 < a  
In the columns under the heading of judicial expenditure shares, we report the point estimate for 
a and test statistics for the hypothesis of a unit root against the alternative with one, two, and 
three lags in the differenced dependent variable. Point estimates are very close to one, and the 
lowest p-value that we obtain is 0.377; thus we do not reject the null.
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  For the period 1902-1937, we cannot test for a unit  root because there are too many 
missing years. However, the high correlation of 0.899 between rank judicial expenditure shares 
and lagged rank judicial expenditure shares during this period, and the high correlation during 
1902-2000 of 0.949 is suggestive of persistence.  Taken together with the evidence on unit roots 
in expenditure during 1951-2000, this suggests that state-level patterns of spending on the 
judiciary across common and civil law states have been persistent over past century. 
 
V. Legal Institutions and Economic Performance  
  In this section we estimate the impact of contemporary institutions on performance. 
Because there may be feedback, we need a source of exogenous source of variation in 
contemporary institutions. We have shown that there is a strong association between the post-
Revolutionary civil law category and quality of state courts that is consistent with a transplant-
civil law hypothesis, and that this relationship exhibits persistence. In this section we invoke the 
transplant-civil  law hypothesis and exclude the post-Revolution civil law category from the 
second stage-structural estimates of economic performance in order to identify the impact of 
institutions on performance. We, however, fully validate this identifying exclusion restriction 
using over-identification test strategy.      16 
We use two measures of current economic performance.  The first is the log of the state’s 
median household income in 2001.  This averaged 10.64, ranging from a low of 10.32 ($30,342) 
in West Virginia to a h igh of 10.92 in Maryland ($55,042). The second is the share of the 
population living under the poverty line in 2001.  It averaged 12 percent, ranging from 6 percent 
in New Hampshire to 19 percent in Louisiana.   
In Table 10, we explore the relationship between the log of median household income 
and the quality of the courts, and the relationship between poverty and the quality of the courts 
after controlling for variables capturing initial conditions including initial population, climate, 
geography, and natural resources. In Table 11, we explore the relationship between institutions 
and economic performance controlling for the relevant initial conditions and intermediate and 
contemporaneous conditions. Both tables have five panels. In Panel A we report structural 
estimates of performance using the 2SLS procedure in which the post-Revolution civil law 
category is excluded for identification; and, in Panel B we list covariates (besides the post-
Revolution civil law category) excluded from the structural equation and test statistics that 
validate these exclusions. In Panel C we report OLS estimates of the relationship between 
institutions and performance that we compare with the 2SLS estimates. In panel D we provide 
evidence of the strength of the post-Revolution civil law category as an instrument from the 
reduced form estimates. In Panel E we validate the identifying exclusion restriction in our 
structural estimates using an over-identification test. Specifically, we use climate as an additional 
instrument because it is always statistically insignificant in our structural (second stage) 
estimates, and it is always statistically significant in our reduced form (first stage) estimates; we 
fail to reject the null hypothesis of no over-identification using the Sargan (1958) test and the 
Hansen (1982) J-test and, thereby, validate the exclusion of the post-Revolution civil law states. 
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Consider first the relationship between performance and institutions controlling for initial 
conditions in Table 10. In both sets of 2SLS structural estimates in Panel A, quality of courts is 
statistically significant at the 1-percent level and leads to better outcomes.  For example, the 
reduced form estimates in Panel D corresponding to the structural estimates for median 
household income and poverty show that if we could change history and have a post-Revolution 
civil law state take on a common law tradition prior to the American Revolution, then court 
quality would increase by 0.463 and 0.499, respectively (on average, roughly one and a third     17 
standard deviations in court quality). This in turn would be associated with a  (0.245*0.463) = 
11.3 percent increase in median income, and a (-.8.180 *0.499) = 4.1 percentage point fall in the 
poverty rate. Comparing the 2SLS and OLS estimates of the structural equation (Panels A and 
C), the point estimates for the impact of courts on performance are very close; thus, there is no 
evidence of attenuation bias or measurement error. Finally, the test statistics in Panels B and E 
fully validate the exclusion of initial condition covariates and the identifying exclusion 
restriction in the 2SLS structural estimates; and the 1-percent significance level of the state court 
regressor and the partial R
2  statistic in Panel D are evidence of the strength of our identifying 
instrument. 
Because the overall estimated impact of institutions on economic performance appears to 
be very high when we control for initial conditions, in Table 11 we control for the initial 
conditions already determined significant for performance (average distance to lakes and oceans 
for median household income, and longitude for poverty), and all intermediate and 
contemporaneous conditions, even though these additional covariates could be endogenous. In 
the 2SLS structural estimates reported in Panel A, the quality of courts is statistically significant 
at no less than a 5-percent level and leads to better outcomes. Again, the impact of reversing a 
post-Revolutionary civil law tradition is substantial: median household income increases by 
(0.192*0.378) = 7.3 percent, and the poverty rate falls by (-8.747*0.469) = 4.1 percentage points. 
Thus, including these additional covariates lowers the estimated impact of institutions on median 
household income but has no discernible impact on the estimated impact on poverty. Results in 
Panels C, B, and E show that, again, the OLS and 2SLS estimates of the impact of institutions on 
performance are quite similar, the exclusion of the full range of covariates in the structural 
equations and identifying exclusion restriction are all valid, and the post-Revolutionary civil law 
category is a strong instrument. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
In this paper, we examine the effects of a unique natural experiment in which some states 
within the United States were settled by civil law countries, others were settled by common law 
countries, and the civil law states, with the possible exception of Louisiana, adopted common 
law around the time of statehood.  The testable hypothesis is that post-Revolution civil law states 
had highly developed legal systems around the time of legal transplantation, and this made them     18 
vulnerable to transplant-civil law effect. We find, after controlling for climate, that those states 
that had been settled by a civil law country and then adopted common l aw after the American 
Revolution have experienced a sizeable and significant negative effect on the quality of their 
state legal institutions. This in turn has had a substantial impact on economic outcomes in 2001. 
  This finding provides important new evidence on the effect of initial conditions on 
institutional and economic development.  Because countries are typically heterogeneous and 
rarely change legal systems, it can be difficult to disentangle the effects of colonial settlement 
from the subsequent evolution of the institutions in that country.  We present evidence that the 
effects of initial legal family, the transplantation of common law into civil law states, or both 
have had very persistent negative effects on legal institutions in the United States context.  This 
differs from prior work that by Acemoglu et al (2001) that has focused primarily on the effect of 
the disease environment on colonists’ willingness to invest in institutions  (see Acemoglu et al, 
2001) or on the suitability of the climate and soil quality for growing crops that required slave 
labor (see Engerman and Sokoloff, 2002).  Clearly, further work remains to be done on isolating 
the effects of the colonial legal systems in the United States (and in other contexts) and in better 
understanding the long-run implications of transplanting one legal system into an area previously 
governed by a different legal system.     19 
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Table 1: Confirmed Private Land Claims  
[to June 30, 1904] 
 
State  Number of Claims  Area of Claims in 
acres 
Classification 
Louisiana  9,302  4,347,891.31  Civil, post-Rev. 
Oregon  7,432  2,614,082.24  Common Law 
Missouri  3,748  1,130,051.62  Civil, post-Rev. 
Mississippi  1,154  773,087.14  Civil, post-Rev. 
Washington  1,011  306,795.91  Common Law 
Michigan  942  280,672.83  Civil, pre-Rev. 
Illinois  936  185,774.37  Civil, pre-Rev. 
Florida  869  2,711,290.57  Civil, post-Rev. 
Indiana  862  188,303.62  Civil, pre-Rev. 
California  588  8,850,143.56  Civil, post-Rev. 
New Mexico  504  9,899,021.67  Civil, post-Rev. 
Alabama  448  251,602.04  Civil, post-Rev. 
Arkansas  248  110,090.39  Civil, post-Rev. 
Wisconsin  175  32,778.82  Civil, pre-Rev. 
Ohio  111  51,161.14  Civil, pre-Rev. 
Arizona  95  295,212.19  Civil, post-Rev. 
Colorado  6  1,397,885.78  Settler 
Iowa  1  5,760.00  Settler 
 
Source:  From the  Report of the Public Lands Commission (Coville et al, 1904) 
http://memory.loc.gov/gc/amrvg/vg57old/vg57.html Image 84.  Oregon and Washington 
were settled by Great Britain.  Utah (60 grants totaling 8,876.80 acres) was not included, 
because we could not find any documentary evidence indicating the source of these land 
claims.  In particular, we could not find any evidence to suggest that they were confirmed 
as part of the work of the Surveyor General of the New Mexico Territory or the Court of 
Private Land Claims, which were responsible for addressing claims in all territory 
acquired from Mexico other than California.  Utah is classified as a settler state. Land 
grants for Texas are not reported because Texas was briefly independent and therefore 
handled land grants itself (the state retained rights to the land). 
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Table 2: Classification of States 
 
First Census 
State 
Year of 
Statehood  Date  Population  
Area in 
Square 
Miles 
Pop. /Sq. 
Mile 
Pre-Revolution Civil Law States 
Illinois  1818  1800  2,458  57914.40.04 
Indiana  1816  1800  2,632  36417.70.07 
Michigan  1837  1800  3,757  96716.10.04 
Ohio  1803  1800  42,159  44824.90.94 
Wisconsin  1848  1820  1,444  65497.80.02 
Average  1824  1804  10,490  60,274.20.22 
Post-Revolution Civil Law States 
Alabama  1819  1800  1,250  52419.0  0.02 
Arizona  1912  1860  6,482  113998.3  0.06 
Arkansas  1836  1810  1,062  53178.6  0.02 
California  1850  1850  92,597  163695.6  0.57 
Florida  1845  1830  34,730  65754.6  0.53 
Louisiana  1812  1810  76,556  51839.7  1.48 
Mississippi  1817  1800  7,600  48430.2  0.16 
Missouri  1821  1810  19,783  69704.3  0.28 
New Mexico  1912  1850  61,547  121589.5  0.51 
Texas  1845  1850  212,592  268580.8  0.79 
Average  1847  1827  51,420  100,919.1  0.44 
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Table 2-(continued) 
First Census   
 
State 
 
Year of 
Statehood 
Date  Population  Area  Pop. /Sq. 
Mile 
Settler States 
Idaho  1890  1870  14,999  83570.10.18 
Iowa  1846  1840  43,112  56271.60.77 
Kansas  1861  1860  107,206  82276.81.30 
Minnesota  1858  1850  6,077  86938.90.07 
Montana  1889  1870  20,595  147042.40.14 
Nebraska  1867  1860  28,841  77353.70.37 
Nevada  1864  1860  6,857  110560.70.06 
North Dakota  1889  1870  2,405  70699.80.03 
Oklahoma  1907  1890/4  61,834  69898.20.88 
South Dakota  1889  1860/5  4,837  77116.50.06 
Utah  1896  1850  11,380  84898.80.13 
Wyoming  1890  1870  9,118  97813.60.09 
Average  1879  1860  27,041.4  88,348.80.34 
Common Law States 
Connecticut           
Delaware  1787  1790  59,096  2489.3  23.74 
Georgia  1788  1790  82,548  59424.8  1.39 
Kentucky  1792  1790  73,677  40409.0  1.82 
Maine  1820  1790  96,540  35384.7  2.73 
Maryland  1788  1790  319,728  12406.7  25.77 
Massachusetts  1788  1790  378,787  10554.6  35.89 
New Hampshire 1788  1790  141,885  9349.9  15.17 
New Jersey  1787  1790  184,139  8721.3  21.11 
New York  1788  1790  340,120  54556.0  6.23 
North Carolina  1789  1790  393,751  53818.5  7.32 
Oregon  1859  1850  12,093  98380.6  0.12 
Pennsylvania  1787  1790  434,373  46055.2  9.43 
Rhode Island  1790  1790  68,825  1545.1  44.55 
South Carolina  1788  1790  249,073  32020.2  7.78 
Tennessee  1796  1790  35,691  42143.3  0.85 
Vermont  1791  1790  85,425  9614.3  8.89 
Virginia  1788  1790  691,737  42774.2  16.17 
Washington  1889  1850  1,201  71299.6  0.02 
West Virginia  1863  1790  55,873  24229.8  2.31 
Average  1803  1796  197,125  33036.0  13.71     27 
Table 3: Selected Summary Statistics  
Variable  Variable Type  Timing  Avg.  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Civil-law: post-
Revolution 
.208  .410  0  1 
Civil law: pre-
Revolution 
.104  .309  0  1 
Settler   .271  .449  0  1 
Common Law  
Dummy relative to 
common law state 
Status 
prior to 
1776 or at 
time of 
statehood 
.417  .498  0  1 
Climate 
 
 
Avg. temp.* 
humidity* 
Precip.*(.0001)  
Annual  13.1  7.50  1.99  39.7 
Confederate 
State 
Dummy relative to 
all other states 
Status 
prior to 
1863 
.229  .425  0  1 
Migration, 
1870-1920 
Estimated net inter-
censal migration/ 
1880 population 
1870-
1920  .268  .517   -0.072  2.338 
Initial state 
income 
Relative annual 
average 
1929 & 
1940 
89.1%  31.9%  38.6%  160% 
Lynching of 
blacks 
0.029  0.054  0.000  0.214 
Lynching of 
whites 
Per 100,000 
1910 population 
1889-
1918 
0.016  0.031  0.000  0.199 
Voter 
participation 
Avg. participation 
rate in federal 
elections 
1916 & 
1920 
55.2%  18.4%  13.05%  80.6% 
Log Median 
Household. 
Income  
10.64  0.15  10.32  10.92 
Poverty rate  
 
 
Annual survey 
 
2001 
12.0%  3.0%  6.0%  19.1% 
Quality of state 
courts 
2.32  0.35  1.2  3.1 
Judges’ 
competence 
Survey of senior law 
firm partners 
 
2001 
2.47  0.37  1.4  3.5 
Public 
corruption 
Per 100,000 1996 
population 
1992-
2001 
2.73  1.52  0.415  7.06 
Property crimes  1999-
2001 
3,578  817  2,198  5,393 
Violent crimes 
 
Per 100,000 
population  1999-
`2001 
424.9  193.9  76.0  821.1 
Lawyers per 
capita, 2001 
Per 1,000 
inhabitants 
2001  3.080  1.193  1.847  6.862 
Law School 
Quality, 2001: 
Expert opinion 
Annual Survey of 
Judges and Lawyers  2001  .313  .468  0  1 
Judicial selection procedures            
Merit system, 
1990 
0.292  0.459  0  1 
Appointment, 
1990  
Versus partisan 
elections; dummy 
variables 
 
1990 
  0.542  0.504  0  1 
State 
constitution 
amendment rate 
 
Annual average  
 
Through 
1990 
 
1.414 
 
1.387 
 
0.25 
 
8.07     28 
 
Table 4-Association Between Climate, 
Disease and Soldier Mortality 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Yellow Fever dummy, 
1700s&1800s; probit 
regression 
Malaria dummy, 
1912; probit 
regression 
Soldier Mortality 
in 1800s; OLS 
regression 
Climate 
 
0.171* 
(0.060) 
0.141* 
(0.041) 
0.078* 
(0.016) 
Constant 
 
-3.79* 
(1.04) 
-2.05* 
(0.567) 
1.12* 
(0.25) 
 
Pseudo R
2 
 
0.427 
 
0.275 
 
 
R
2 
     
0.327 
 
Notes: In this table and all other tables, *, ** and *** denote significance at the 1-
percent, 5 -percent and 10- percent levels. Standard errors are  reported in 
parentheses. Malaria dummy = 1 if state had outbreaks during 1912, 0 otherwise. 
Earliest data from 1881 is not used because almost all of the states were afflicted 
(Source is Pan American Health Organization, 1969). Yellow fever dummy = 1 if 
there were 5 or more major outbreaks during the 1700s and 1800s, 0 otherwise 
(robust if we use 3 or more major outbreaks; source is World Health Organization, 
Geneva, 1998, Appendix I). Solder mortality is the average annual share of solder 
dying as a share of soldier strength during 1929-1838 and 1839-1854 and then 
averaged and was computed in Mitchener and McLean, 2003.     29 
 
 
Table 5-Determinants of Institutions 
Dependent Variable is Quality of State Courts, 2001 
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Civil-law state: 
post-Revolution 
  -0.399* 
(0.116) 
-0.382* 
(0.102) 
  -0.438* 
(0.116) 
-0.386* 
(0.090) 
Civil-law: pre-
Revolution 
  -0.026 
(0.143) 
X    -0.119 
(0.131) 
X 
Settler state 
 
  -0.074 
(0.117) 
X    -0.198*** 
(0.112) 
X 
Confederate 
State 
-0.360* 
(0.107) 
0.005 
(0.149) 
X    0.024 
(0.148) 
X 
Climate 
 
  -0.017*** 
(0.009) 
-0.015* 
(0.006) 
  -0.007 
(0.008) 
X 
Judges: Merit 
vs. partisan 
elections 
      0.641* 
(0.122) 
0.615* 
(0.139) 
0.561* 
(0.109) 
Appointment 
vs. partisan 
elections 
      0.602* 
(0.116) 
0.433* 
(0.133) 
0.423* 
(0.110) 
Constitution 
amendment 
rate, logged 
      -0.109** 
(0.051) 
-0.019 
(0.058) 
X 
Lawyers per 
capita, 2001 
      -0.076*** 
(0.038) 
-0.085** 
(0.038) 
-0.073** 
(0.033) 
Law School 
Quality, 2001 
      0.173*** 
(0.092) 
0.199** 
(0.089) 
0.199** 
(0.080) 
Constant 
 
2.405* 
(0.107) 
2.657* 
(0.131) 
2.601* 
(0.080) 
1.995* 
(0.124) 
2.367* 
(0.189) 
2.175* 
(0.117) 
P-value for 
exclusion of X 
from 
unrestricted 
regression 
     
0.938 
     
0.481 
 
Adjusted R
2  0.179  0.346  0.383  0.409  0.540  0.545     30 
 
 
Table 6: Alternative Dependent Variables 
 
State classification  Baseline  Robustness check 3 
Dependent 
Variable 
Courts 
Quality 
Judicial 
Competence 
Property 
Crimes 
Violent 
Crimes 
Corruption  Corruption 
Civil-law state: 
post-Revolution 
 
-0.382* 
(0.102) 
 
-0.345* 
(0.113) 
 
723** 
(284) 
 
156** 
(64.4) 
 
X 
 
1.19** 
(2.50) 
Civil-law: pre-
Revolution 
X  X  X  X  X  X 
Settler state  
  X  X  X  -120** 
(58.9)  X  X 
Confederate state  X  X  459*** 
(275) 
X  X  X 
Climate 
 
-0.015* 
(0.006) 
-0.017** 
(0.006) 
X  X  0.064** 
  (0.028) 
X 
Constant 
 
2.657* 
(0.131) 
2.760* 
(0.089) 
3322* 
(121) 
425* 
(34.4) 
1.891* 
(0.428) 
2.503* 
(0.234) 
P-value for 
exclusion of X 
from unrestricted 
regression 
 
0.938 
 
0.598 
 
0.647 
 
0.604 
 
0.685 
 
0.354 
Adjusted R
2  0.383  0.321  0.235 
 
0.211  0.079  0.076 
 
 
 
     31 
 
 
Table 7- Natural Resource, Population, Geography and Institutions 
Dependent Variable is Quality of State Courts, 2001 
 
Additional 
Controls 
Natural 
Resources and 
Initial Population 
Geography  Nat Resources, 
Initial Population 
and Geography 
Civil-law: post-
Revolution 
-0.367* 
(0.096) 
-0.352* 
(0.099) 
-0.347* 
(0.095) 
Climate  -0.015* 
(0.005) 
-0.019* 
(0.006) 
-0.018* 
(0.005) 
Petroleum and 
Natural Gas 
Dummy 
-0.218** 
(0.085) 
  -0.187** 
(0.086) 
Share of counties 
close to the ocean 
  0.248** 
(0.119) 
0.192 
(0.117) 
Constant 
 
2.653* 
(0.078) 
2.588* 
(0.077) 
2.636* 
(0.077) 
Variables 
excluded: 
     
Initial Conditions  Civil-law: pre-
Rev, Settler, 
Confederate 
Civil-law: pre-Rev, 
Settler, Confederate 
Civil-law: pre-Rev, 
Settler, 
Confederate 
Geography  
 
  State Latitude, State 
Longitude, Coastal 
Dummy, Share of 
counties close to 
major river, navigable 
river, lake 
State Latitude, 
State Longitude, 
Coastal Dummy, 
Share of counties 
close to major 
river, navigable 
river, lake 
Natural Resources 
and Population 
Initial Population 
Density, Mining 
Dummy 
  Initial Population 
Density, Mining 
Dummy 
P-value for F -test 
of joint exclusions 
from unrestricted 
regression 
 
0.961 
 
0.964 
 
 
0.999 
Adjusted R
2 
 
0.451  0.426  0.471 
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Table 8-Panel A 
Persistence of Intermediate Institutions 
Dependent Variable is Quality of State Courts, 2001 
  1  2 
Migration, 1870-1920  0.023 
(0.094) 
X 
Initial income, 1929&40  0.133 
(0.160) 
X 
Lynching 1889-1918, of 
Blacks  
-3.371** 
(1.324) 
-3.758* 
(0.764) 
Lynching, 1889-1918, of 
Whites 
-0.201 
(1.552) 
X 
Voter participation, 
1916&20  
-0.000 
(0.0004) 
X 
Constant 
 
2.317* 
(0.266) 
2.432* 
(0.046) 
P-value for exclusion of X 
from unrestricted 
regression 
  0.946 
Adjusted R
2  0.279  0.331 
   
Table 8-Panel B 
Determinants of Medium Term Institutions 
Dependent Variable  Black Lynching, 
1889-1918 
Voter 
Participation, 
1916&1920  
Civil-law: post-
Revolution 
0.0388* 
(0.0091) 
X 
Civil-law: pre-
Revolution 
X  X 
Settler state 
 
0.020** 
(0.009) 
X 
Confederate state  X  -37.7* 
(3.11) 
Climate 
 
.0017* 
(0.0008) 
X 
Black population 
share, 1910 
0.203* 
(0.034) 
X 
Constant 
 
-0.0289* 
(0.0106) 
63.9* 
(1.49) 
P-value for exclusion 
of X from unrestricted 
regression  
 
0.719 
 
0.467 
Adjusted R
2 
 
0.821  0.756     33 
Table 9: Persistence  
Panel A: Differences in Ranked Categorical Averages Ranked on a Scale of 
1 (worst) to 48 (best) 
Paired 
Category
 
Rank of State Court 
Expenditures
b 
Rank of Public 
Corruption
b 
Common Law – Settler  5.6* 
(0.000) 
-5.9** 
(0.041) 
Common Law  – Pre-
Revolutionary 
15.1* 
(0.000) 
3.0 
(0.441) 
Common-Law  – Civil: Post- 
Revolution 
6.1* 
(0.000) 
4.6 
(0.113) 
Settler – Civil: Pre-Revolution  9.5* 
(0.000) 
8.9** 
(0.045) 
Settler  – Civil: P ost-
Revolution 
0.69 
(0.289) 
10.6* 
(0.002) 
Civil: Pre  – Civil: Post-
Revolution 
-8.8* 
(0.000) 
1.7 
(0.681) 
Overall Common Law-Civil 
Law 
7.0* 
(0.000) 
6.4* 
(0.001) 
a  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
b A two-sided two-sample t test with equal variances 
is performed and its P-values are reported in parentheses for the null hypothesis that there 
the difference in ranked means is zero; *, ** and *** denote significance at the 1-percent, 
5-percent and 10-percent levels. The court expenditure data cover 14 years between 1902 
and 1937 all 50 years during 1951-2000. For 1902-1937, the share is spending on courts 
as a share of total expenditures for payments. For 1951-2000, the expenditure share is 
defined as the courts (criminal and civil) and activities associated with courts, legal 
services and counseling of indigent or other need persons as a share of total state 
expenditures.
30 The data cover for public corruption cover three periods: 1976-81, 1982-
1991 and 1992-2001. 
31 
Panel B: Regression Analysis of  
Corruption and Judicial Expenditure Shares 
Dependent 
Variable 
State 
Corruption 
Judicial Expenditure Shares 
 
Test  OLS  Unit root test 
Lagged Dep. 
Variable, 
decadal  
0.514* 
(0.0885) 
 
   
Annual   0.936  0.999  0.999  1.001 
Lags  0  1  2  3 
Observations  96  2306  2260  2214 
Test statistics for Unit Root Hypothesis 
Model: jud exp sharesi,t =  a jud exp sharesi,t-1 + ui,t , where 
I = 1,..48 = state 
T = 1950… 2000 = year 
Null and Alternative 
Hypotheses 
Null: a = 1 
Alternative: a <1 
P-value for null versus 
alternative; Levin et al (2003)  
 
0.425 
 
0.377 
 
0.552     34 
Table 10: Institutions and Economic Performance with Controls 
for Initial Conditions (Climate, Population, Geography and Natural 
Resources)  
Panel A- Second Stage 2SLS Structural Estimates 
Dependent Variable  Log Median 
Household Income 
Poverty Rate 
Quality of state courts, 
instrumented 
0.245* 
(0.082) 
-8.180* 
(1.454) 
Share of counties close 
to an ocean  
0.169* 
(0.048) 
X 
Share of counties close 
to a lake 
0.183 
(0.109) 
X 
 
State longitude 
 
X  -0.048** 
(0.020) 
Panel B-Hypothesis tests for 2SLS 
Structural Estimates 
Variables excluded 
from the structural 
equation besides Civil-
law: post-Revolution 
Climate, 
confederate, log init 
pop density, mining, 
petroleum and 
natural gas, latitude, 
longitude, coastal, 
close to major river, 
and navigable river 
Climate, confederate, log 
init pop density, mining, 
petroleum and natural gas, 
latitude, coastal, close to 
lake, ocean, major and 
navigable river 
P-value for exclusions   0.932  0.964 
Panel C-OLS Regressions of Structural Equation 
(Covariates are not reported) 
Dependent Variable  Log Median 
Household Income 
Poverty Rate 
Quality of state courts 
 
0.228*    
(0.045) 
    -6.610* 
(0.811) 
Adjusted R
2 
 
0.494  0.595 
Panel D-Reduced Form Estimates  
Dependent Variable is Quality of State Courts 
(Covariates are not reported) 
Civil-law: post-
Revolution 
-0.463*    
(0.105) 
-0.499*     
(0.104) 
Partial R
2 
(Excluded 
instruments) 
0.304  0.337 
Panel E- Over-identification Test 
Post-Revolution civil law and climate are the excluded instruments 
P-values for null hypothesis of no over-identification 
Sargan test  0.483  0.656 
Hansen’s J test  0.425  0.656     35 
Table 11: Institutions and Economic Performance with Controls for  
Initial, Intermediate and Contemporaneous Conditions 
Panel A- Second Stage 2SLS Structural Estimates 
Dependent Variable  Log Median 
Household Income 
Poverty Rate 
Quality of state courts, 
instrumented 
0.192** 
(0.086) 
-8.747*    
(1.493) 
Initial state income, 
1929&40 
0.169** 
(0.080) 
X 
Migration, 1870-1920 
 
-0.061** 
(0.025) 
1.027***    
(0.568) 
Lawyers per capita, 
2001 
 
0.029*** 
(0.017) 
-0.724*    
(0.238) 
Panel B- Hypothesis tests for 2SLS 
Structural Estimates 
Variables excluded 
from the structural 
equation besides Civil-
law: post-Revolution 
Distance to lake, 
distance to ocean, 
black lynching, white 
lynching, early voter 
participation, judicial 
merit and 
appointment systems, 
amendment rate, law 
school quality  
Distance to lake, distance to 
ocean, black lynching, white 
lynching, early voter 
participation, initial state 
income, judicial merit and 
appointment systems, 
amendment rate, law school 
quality. 
P-value for exclusions   0.882  0.998 
Panel C-OLS Regressions of Structural Estimates 
(Covariates are not reported) 
Dependent Variable  Log Median 
Household Income 
Poverty Rate 
Quality of state courts 
 
0.218*    
(0.043) 
-6.714*    
(0.771) 
Adjusted R
2 
 
0.660  0.642 
Panel D-Reduced Form Results 
Dependent Variable is Quality of State Courts 
(Covariates are not reported) 
Civil-law: post-
Revolution 
-0.378*    
(0.100) 
-0.469*    
(0.106) 
Partial R
2 
(Excluded instruments) 
0.249  0.309 
Panel E- Over-identification Test 
Post-Revolution civil law and climate are the excluded instruments 
P-values for null hypothesis of no over-identification 
Sargan Test  0.860  0.683 
Hansen’s J test  0.847  0.718     36 
 
                                                 
1 Friedman (1973), p. 169. 
2 Banner (2000), p. 95 quoting J. B. C. Lucas to Thomas Jefferson, 10 Dec 1805, Lucas Papers, 
box 2, Missouri Historical Society. 
3 See Bancroft (1888, reprinted 1970), p. 317, footnote 11 and J. Ross Browne (1850, reprinted 
1973), David Langum (1987) also provides some interesting quotes from American traders who 
lived in Mexican California about their dislike of civil law.  See Chapter 5, especially pp. 146ff. 
4 Crosby (1945) p. 58 
5 South Carolina had both Spanish and French settlements.  These settlements failed, however, 
and surviving colonists left.  Georgia had Spanish missions.  See Gannon (1992) on the Spanish 
settlement of Santa Elena and the Spanish missions in Georgia.  There were early French 
settlements in Maine and Vermont, but these appear not to have been permanent.  Much of the 
French-American presence in Maine and Vermont dates from migration into Canada during the 
late eighteenth century.  Calloway (1990), Coolidge (1938, reprint 1989) and Hatch (1919). 
6 See Rink (1986).  In 1673, the Dutch temporarily regained control of New Netherland.  The 
land was officially ceded to England in 1674.   
7 Johnson (1919, reprinted 1996). 
8 For court records pertaining to New York and New Jersey, see Van Laer (1974) for court 
records of the Director General and Council of New Netherland (the highest court, covering all 
of New Netherland) 1638-1664; and O’Callaghan and Fernow (1897, reprinted 1976) for court 
records of the Courts of Schouts and schepens for New Amsterdam. For court records pertaining 
to Pennsylvania and Delaware, see Brodhead and O’Callaghan (1853), volume 12 for Dutch 
minutes of court actions, 1655-1657; Armstrong (1969) for records of the Upland Court (Chester 
County, Pennsylvania), 1676-1681 which was a Dutch court that continued to operate after 
English acquisition; Gehring (1981) has records for the Dutch 1648-1664; and  Johnson (1930) 
for some court minutes for New Sweden, 1643-1644. 
9 The large number of land grants in Illinois (936 grants), Indiana (862), and Michigan (942), 
suggests that the population was significant.  Further, records from the village assemblies, which 
governed many aspects of village life, and records of disputes that made it to New Orleans 
suggest that there was something similar to a formal judicial system.  For more on French 
Illinois, see Ekberg (1998) and Briggs (1990).  Unfortunately, there was only rarely a notary in 
the Illinois country, and what notarial records there may have been have not survived. There has 
been an assumption by some historians that there was no legal system in some colonies prior to 
the American legal system. Book length legal histories that cover the colonial period exist for 
Arkansas, California, Florida, Missouri, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Texas.  See Arnold (1985) 
on Arkansas, Banner (2000) on Missouri, Cutter (1995) on Texas and New Mexico, Fernandez 
(2001) on Louisiana, Langum (1987) on California, and Matthews (1987) on Florida. On 
Natchez, Mississippi, see Holmes (1963) and on Mobile, Alabama, see Hamilton (1910). For 
West Florida, see also Archives of Spanish Government of West Florida, 1782-1816. National 
Archives T1116.   
10 Gates (1968). 
11 Ekberg (1998) and Briggs (1990) do not mention courts, but the legal system is not the main 
topic of their work.  
12 Congress also appointed land commissions to bring land grants made by prior governments 
into the United States system of property rights.  See Clay (1999).     37 
                                                                                                                                                             
13 This paragraph draws heavily on Dargo (1975). 
14 Friedman (1973), p. 168,quoting Judge John Coburn to Secretary of State James Madison, 
1807. 
15 See Friedman (1973), pp. 171-176. 
16 This survey was repeated in 2003 and the average rankings across the two surveys are highly 
correlated (0.986). We use only the 2001 survey because we do not have comparable economic 
data for 2003.  
17 We exclude treatment of class action suits and punitive damages in our calculated average 
because these two categories cannot be determined in several states. 
18 Our results our robust if we use several alternative measures including annual temperature 
multiplied by and annual humidity, and annual humidity multiplied by annual precipitation. 
19 Yellow fever is a dummy variable that measures whether the state had at least five reported 
yellow fever epidemics during the 1700s and 1800s.  Malaria is a dummy variable that measures 
whether malaria was considered to be endemic to the state in 1912.  In the 1800s malaria existed 
in a number of other states, but the malaria problem was reportedly not as severe in those states 
as it was during 1912. The climate variable is also positively associated with solider mortality in 
the 1800s, which are overall deaths as a share of soldier strength (see Mitchener and McLean, 
2003).   
20 This coding is taken from Hanssen (2002), who notes that the selection and retention are 
similar for lower level state judges.  
21 We also used the popular survey, but found that this had no explanatory power. 
22 Except where specifically noted, these results and all other reported results in this section are 
robust to the alternative state classifications discussed in section III. The three reclassifications 
are: 1) Wisconsin, Ohio, and Arizona are moved to settler states; 2)  Delaware, Pennsylvania, 
New York, and New Jersey are moved to civil law pre-Revolution states; 3) starting from the 
baseline classification, the reclassifications in 1) and 2) are combined. The results are also robust 
to the inclusion of a separate dummy variable for Louisiana as it is arguable that it was subject to 
only the civil law effect and it was not subject to a transplant effect. 
23 We ran a similar regression in which Confederate states were replaced with Slave states.  
Slave states included the eleven Confederate states, and Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and 
Tennessee.  In part because of the inclusion of Delaware, the coefficient on slave state was 
smaller and the adjusted R-squared was much lower.  The coefficient may also have been 
smaller, because these states experienced fewer negative affects related to the Civil War 
24 For example, Wahl (1998) shows that antebellum legal institutions effectively protected the 
value of rented slaves. 
25 These measures are indirect because they measure outcomes related to the judicial system, 
rather than the quality of the judicial system itself.  Property and violent crimes are further 
complicated by the fact that they are subject to reporting biases at two levels.  Individuals must 
report the crimes to government agencies, and these agencies must report them to the FBI.  
Corruption data is complicated by the fact that these are convictions, and so reflect both the 
propensity to prosecute and the actual conviction rate, both of which may vary over time. 
26An important  source on lynching data is Elizabeth Hines and Eliza Steelwater, Project HAL: 
Historical American Lynching Data Collection Project, 
http://people.uncw.edu/hinese/HAL/HAL%20Web%20Page.htm     38 
                                                                                                                                                             
27 We might have expected early voter participation and relative income to be significant, since 
they are correlated with the dependent variable. These variables are, however, also correlated 
with black lynching. These results are robust if we use corruption or judicial competence as our 
measure of institutions. 
28 A shortcoming of the Levin, Lin, and Chu test is that it assumes that all the state rank 
expenditure series are stationary under the alternative. To address this issue, we employ the Im, 
Pesaran and Shin (2003) test, which is consistent with the alternative that a fraction of the rank 
expenditures are stationary. Again, we fail to reject the null of a unit root. 
29 These tests hold as null hypotheses that the post-Revolution civil law category and climate are 
uncorrelated with the error term of the structural equation for economic performance under the 
assumptions of homoskesdasticity and heteroskedastisticity.  
30 Sources for the period 1951-2000 are U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State and Local 
Government Finances and Census of Governments  (various years), and 
http://www.census.gov/govs/www/class.html  
http://www.census.gov/govs/www/class_ch4_chartb.html . Sources for 1902-37 include 
Department of Commerce and Labor, Wealth, Debt and Taxation Special Reports of the Census 
Office, U.S. Government Printing Office; and Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Financial Statistics of States (for the years including 1915, 1916, 1917, 1918, 1924, 1925, 1926, 
1927, 1928, 1929, 1930. 1931, 1937), Washington Government Printing Office. 
31 We use state population in 1979, 1987, and 1996 to convert overall federal convictions of 
corruption public officials into convictions per 100,000 in the 1976-81, 1982-91 and 1992-2001, 
respectively. Sources for public corruption are the Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, 
United States Department of Justice, Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the 
Public Integrity Section (for the years 1981, 1991, and 2001). Population data are from U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, State and Metropolitan Area Data Book, 1979, 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of Population and Housing, Population and Housing 
Unit Counts, and U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2002. 
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